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Abstract
This paper proposes a policy aimed at tackling un-
employment that arises from macroeconomic coordina-
tion failure. The policy offers firms wage subsidies
payable only if the total number of new hires made
across the economy is below a prespecified threshold.
Subsidies provide incentives for firms to create jobs but
the policy's goal is to generate a sufficiently large amount
of employment spillovers to set off hiring com-
plementarities taking employment beyond the threshold.
Thus, subsidies are not distributed but the policy
achieves a Pareto improvement. The market structure is
important for policy design. Aggregative game techni-
ques prove useful for the oligopsonistic case.
1 | INTRODUCTION
New hiring by one firm is a reason for new hiring by other firms because of employment
externalities related to additional aggregate demand, new trading opportunities, or production
synergies. Without a coordinated action, however, the virtuous hiring cycle may not start,
stranding the economy in a low‐employment, low‐spending equilibrium as in the aftermath of
the 2007–2009 financial crisis (OECD, 2016). The traditional approach to this problem em-
phasizes a “big push,” when one large player like the government spends enough to convince
others to spend. In this paper, we show how a “zero push” can achieve the same results.
With the economy in a low‐employment equilibrium, we propose a policy that offers firms
wage subsidies for new hires payable only if the total number of new hires made in the
economy does not exceed a prespecified threshold. An example would be a promise to cover all
new labor costs contingent on that less than, say, 100,000 new jobs are created in total. From a
firm's perspective two outcomes can occur from this policy. One outcome is when the number
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --
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of new jobs is less than the threshold, in which case the firm has its additional labor costs
covered while keeping all the additional revenue. The second outcome is when the threshold is
met and no subsidies are paid. The firm then benefits from employment spillovers generated by
a substantial increase in total employment which makes hiring profitable even without any
subsidies. With hiring profitable in both scenarios and, thus, all firms hiring, the threshold for
new hires is reached, bringing the economy to high‐employment equilibrium without any
subsidies paid.1
For more intuition, it is useful to illustrate the contingent wage subsidy with a hiring game
between two firms as shown in Figure 1. Each firm has a hiring decision to make by choosing
either status quo or hire. Because of externalities hiring is profitable only if both firms hire;
otherwise it is not (see panel (a)). The resultant game is a coordination game with two sym-
metric equilibria of {status quo, status quo} and {hire, hire}. Now consider a policy that pays a
subsidy to a hiring firm contingent on the other firm choosing status quo as shown in panel (b).
In the modified game hiring becomes a dominant strategy resulting in the unique hiring
equilibrium. The contingent subsidy policy effectively transforms the coordination game into a
“prisoner's dilemma” game with the desirable equilibrium outcome but no subsidies disbursed.
In the man text, we use the labor market model with private information and adverse
selection developed by Weiss (1980). In this model, there are multiple Pareto‐ranked equilibria
due to the employment externalities which arise from adverse selection because the expected
productivity of a new hire is larger when more people are employed.2 In particular, in a low‐
wage and low‐employment equilibrium the wage is low because firms hold low expectations
about workers' productivity which results in only less able workers accepting employment. A
wage rise and subsequent increase in total employment create a positive externality as firms
favorably update their beliefs about new hires' productivity. If the total amount of externality is
sufficiently large, it can start the virtuous process of hiring complementarities bringing the
economy to higher employment equilibrium. We assume that without coordinated effort this
process cannot be started or that no individual firm is big enough to kickstart it unilaterally.
The purpose of contingent wage subsidies is to generate a sufficiently large aggregate ex-
ternality that would set off hiring complementarities. We demonstrate for competitive and
oligopsonistic labor markets that it is possible to design a contingent wage subsidy policy such
that it achieves high‐employment equilibrium without distributing any subsidies. However, we
note that the market structure is a very important factor for policy design. Not all policies that
are effective for the competitive market would also be effective for the oligopsonistic market. In
particular, the insurance policy that only compensates for losses would turn ineffective.
The analysis of the oligopsonistic case is important in light of mounting evidence for in-
creasing employer market power in labor markets (Naidu, Posner, & Weyl, 2018). We undertake
this analysis using the aggregative game techniques developed by Martimort and Stole (2012).
We consider the labor market where firms are not wage‐takers and hire labor to maximize their
profits which also depend on total employment as it determines the wage rate in the economy.
1The proposed policy is an application of the “dominant assurance contract” of Tabarrok (1998), which is an extension
of the “assurance contract” of Dybvig and Spatt (1983). See Related Literature for further discussion.
2Our modeling choice is motivated by the tractability and compactness of the model in Weiss (1980) that requires only
few preliminary digressions. Generally, however, the modeling approach is immaterial for our results as long as it
generates multiple equilibria and strategic complementarities in employment. For instance, one alternative would be to
use the human capital model with random matching of Acemoglu (1996), which also features pecuniary employment
externalities and multiple Pareto‐ranked equilibria. Another alternative would be to use technological employment
externalities as in, for example, Romer (1986) or Lucas (1988).
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But as it is only total employment that matters for profits, not its distribution among firms, the
resultant oligopsony is an aggregative game. Furthermore, as our interest lies with equilibrium
aggregates, the aggregate concurrence principle developed by Martimort and Stole (2012) is
applicable to determine the equilibrium aggregates before and after the introduction of con-
tingent wage subsidy policy. Specifically, we apply this principle to demonstrate that our
constructed policy eliminates the low‐employment equilibrium leaving only the high‐
employment equilibrium whereas no new equilibria are created.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Following a literature review in
Section 2, we study the competitive labor market in Section 3 where we also introduce the
contingent wage subsidy policy. In Section 4 we study the case of oligopsonistic labor market.
Section 5 concludes the study. All omitted proofs are in the Appendix.
2 | RELATED LITERATURE
It is a long established view in economics that macroeconomic coordination failures can be a
cause of unemployment. Such failures can arise due to aggregate demand externalities
(Hart, 1982; Heller, 1986; Shleifer, 1986); production input externalities (Matsuyama, 1991;
Weitzman, 1982), trading and firm entry externalities (Chatterjee, Cooper, & Ravikumar, 1993;
Diamond, 1982), and information externalities (Lockwood, 1991). See Cooper and John (1988)
for a general unifying framework of strategic complementarities in employment; for recent
examples, see Chamley (2014), Michaillat and Saez (2015), Kaplan and Menzio (2016), and
Guimaraes and Machado (2018).
The contingent wage subsidy is an example of the assurance contract proposed by Dybvig
and Spatt (1983). In collective action problems participation externalities are public goods and,
therefore, decentralized outcomes can be suboptimal. To encourage participation Dybvig and
Spatt (1983) propose an insurance scheme dubbed as the “assurance contract” that compensates
participants for their losses in the event of low participation. The best known example is the
deposit insurance scheme, which eliminates the bank run equilibrium at no cost (Diamond and
Dybvig (1983). Kiyotaki (1988) proposes a similar insurance policy to eliminate the pessimistic
capital investment equilibrium. Another example is crowdfunding's “all‐or‐nothing” fundrais-
ing method which refunds contributions if the threshold for contributions is not reached.
The compensation of losses may not be sufficient to eliminate low‐participation equilibria.
Even with insurance against losses agents may abstain from participating if they think others
will abstain. Tabarrok (1998) suggests an extension to the assurance contract which not only
compensates for losses but also offers a bonus to participating agents in the event of low
participation. Then, participation becomes a dominant strategy which ensures high‐
participation equilibrium and no costs incurred (see Zubrickas, 2014 for an application to
crowdfunding). Cason and Zubrickas (2017, 2019) experimentally show that such an extension
offers a substantial economic improvement to a simple assurance contract. Finally, the present
paper is the first study of assurance contracts in an environment beyond price‐taking firms.
(a) (b)FIGURE 1 Two‐firm hiring with
employment externalities. (a) No
subsidy; (b) Contingent subsidy
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3 | COMPETITIVE LABOR MARKET
3.1 | Setup
There are a unit continuum of workers and a setN of firms, indexed by N∈i , that can hire
workers.3 Let the number of firms, denoted by N≡N | |, be larger than 1. Firms produce
the same output using an identical constant returns to scale technology, where workers' labor is
the only input. The price of a unit of output is normalized to 1. Firms are risk neutral profit
maximizers.
Workers differ in the amount of output they produce if hired by a firm. A worker's pro-
ductivity, denoted by θ, can take values from an interval ∞θ θ θ θ[ , ], 0 < < < , and levels of
productivity are distributed in the population according to distribution function F θ( ) with the
density function f θ( ) > 0. A worker's productivity θ is private information and his reservation
utility is given by a nondecreasing continuous “home production” function r θ( ). A worker
accepts employment if and only if his wage is at least r θ( ).
As firms cannot distinguish among workers by their productivity, we assume that workers
are all employed for the same wage. Then, the aggregate supply of labor S w( ) for a given wage
w is determined by
⎧
⎨⎪
⎩⎪
≤ ≤S w
w r θ
F r w r θ w r θ
w r θ
( ) =
0 for < ( ),
( ( )) for ( ) ( ),
1 for > ( ),
−1 (1)
where r w θ r θ w( ) = sup( : ( ) = )−1 . The expected productivity of a worker employed at a wage
≥w r θ( ) is given by
⎧
⎨
⎪⎪⎪
⎩
⎪⎪⎪
∫
∫
≤μ w
θ w r θ
θdF θ
S w
r θ w r θ
θdF θ w r θ
( ) =
for = ( ),
( )
( )
for ( ) < ( ),
( ) for > ( ).
θ
r w
θ
θ
( )−1
(2)
On the demand side for labor, each firm can hire at most e workers, where ∈e (0, 1) and
Ne > 1. For a given wage w a firm hires workers up to its capacity if and only if their expected
individual productivity μ w( ) is at least w. Let ∈e e[0, ]i denote the population share of workers
hired by firm N∈i i, , and let ∑E e= i i denote the total population share of workers in
employment, also referred to as total employment.
By competitive labor market we understand a labor market with a large number of firms
and free entry, where each firm takes total employment E, wage w, and expected pro-
ductivity μ as fixed. In particular, by free entry we understand that in the setN there is
always a firm with the zero level of own employment that is ready to hire labor if it becomes
profitable.
3In this section, we draw on the textbook exposition of the labor market model of Weiss (1980) presented in Mas‐Colell,
Whinston, and Green (1995, Ch. 13).
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3.2 | Equilibrium employment
First, we define the market clearing wage and firms' expected profits. We observe that the
conditions of Ne > 1 and of hiring at ≥μ w w( ) imply that there is no rationing in the labor
market. For our analysis, it is convenient to define the market clearing wage as a function of
total employment E, which is done by equating it with the supply of labor: S w E( ) = . Thus, we
obtain the clearing wage function
w E r F E( ) = ( ( )).−1 (3)
To avoid multiple clearing wages at full employment, we assume
Assumption 1. ≤μ w w( (1)) (1).
In words, at full employment we require the expected productivity be less than the lowest
wage necessary for full employment. In addition to the purpose of inverting the market
clearance condition, this assumption ensures that firms' demand for labor is always met.
Firm i's expected profits as a function of own and total levels of employment are given by
π e E e μ w E w E( , ) = ( ( ( )) − ( )).i i (4)
From (4) we observe that the expected marginal net value of labor, μ w E w E( ( )) − ( ), depends
on total employment in the economy. The expected productivity depends on the population of
workers employed, which also determines the market clearing wage. Thus, a firm's profits
depend not only on own workers but also on workers hired by other firms through their effect
on the expected marginal net value of labor.4
In our analysis, we predict the outcomes of the labor market to be in equilibrium. As the
focus is on aggregate levels of employment, we define equilibrium employment as
Definition 1. A total level of employment E is equilibrium if no firm can unilaterally
increase its profits by changing its level of employment.
Assumption 1 implies that our definition of equilibrium employment in the competitive
labor market can be expressed as the condition of zero expected profits
μ w E w E( ( )) = ( ), (5)
which, after transformation, can be rewritten as
∫ ≡θdF θ
r F E
η E E( )
( ( ))
( ) = .θ
F E( )
−1
−1
(6)
4If we extend the model with the market for the consumption good, the employment externality discussed in the text
can also be related to aggregate demand externality. The clearance of the labor market implies the clearance of the
market for the consumption good. Then, total employment determines aggregate demand for the consumption good
which, in turn, affects firm profits. But this extension does not affect our analysis presented below and, therefore, is not
modeled.
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The employment equilibria are determined by the fixed points of the function η. Graphi-
cally, the fixed points are found at the intersection of the graph of η and the 45‐degree line (see
Figure 2). We also observe that our assumptions on reservation utility r and distribution
function F imply that the function η is continuous and nondecreasing with its range and
domain of [0, 1].
In what follows, we restrict our attention to scenarios with a multiple but finite number of
nonzero equilibrium levels of employment that can be Pareto‐ranked. (In a competitive market
an equilibrium with a lower level of employment is Pareto‐dominated by an equilibrium with a
higher level of employment.) We also require employment be a locally stable equilibrium which
we define as
Definition 2. Equilibrium E < 1 is locally stable if there is ε such that
μ w E w E( ( ′)) > ( ′) for ∈E E ε E′ ( − , ) and μ w E w E( ( ′)) < ( ′) for ∈E E E ε′ ( , + ). If
E = 1 is equilibrium, then it is locally stable if there is ε such that μ w E w E( ( ′)) > ( ′)
for ∈E E ε E′ ( − , ).
In words, profits are negative to the right and positive to the left of a locally stable equili-
brium. Observing that for employment levels E at which the value η E( ) is below the 45‐degree
line profits are negative and otherwise are positive, we have that an equilibrium is locally stable
if its corresponding fixed point is crossed from above the 45‐degree line. The implication is that
a locally stable employment equilibrium is robust to relatively small perturbations in
employment.
For the competitive market environment, we impose
Assumption 2. There are two locally stable equilibria, E E{ , }1 2 , where E E0 < <1 2.
The restriction to two locally stable equilibria is made for the convenience of exposition and
without any loss of generality as the analysis presented is applicable to any (finite) number of
locally stable equilibria. As it is relevant for subsequent analysis, we note that Assumption 2
implies that there must be at least one other equilibrium between the two locally stable
equilibria due to the continuity of η. It is implicitly assumed, and as it follows from our
modeling of competitive labor market, no firm can unilaterally shift the economy from E1 to any
FIGURE 2 Equilibrium employment in a competitive labor
market
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other employment equilibrium. We also note that due to Assumption 1 there cannot be other
equilibrium to the right from the highest locally stable equilibrium. As an illustration, Figure 2
presents a commonly encountered example (see, e.g., Cooper & John, 1988) with three nonzero
equilibria ∘ ∘E E E E E E{ , , }, 0 < < <1 2 1 2, determined by fixed points A, B, and C, respectively,
where E1 and E2 are locally stable equilibria.
3.3 | Contingent wage subsidy
Consider the labor market shown in Figure 2 and let the initial state of the economy be at point A
with employment equilibrium E1. Suppose that the government plans a policy aimed at bringing the
economy to point C with employment equilibrium E2. First of all, in relationship to the local
stability of E1, we observe that if a policy takes total employment between E1 and ∘E , the effect of
this policy will be under the pressure of reversal by firms because of negative (regular) profits in this
region. For a policy to be successful, the leap in new jobs created needs to be sufficiently large so
that firms find themselves in the region of positive profits or where the expected marginal value of
labor exceeds its costs, that is between ∘E and E2. Once in this region, firms' profit maximization
together with free entry would ultimately shift employment to E2.
Next we propose a policy which solely aims at generating the leap in employment described
above and, by design, is not expected to bear any costs for the government. The policy offers
firms contingent wage subsidies for new hires payable only if the total number of new hires
counted across all firms does not exceed a prespecified threshold. Sufficiently generous sub-
sidies provide incentives for firms to hire until the threshold is reached. But if we set the
threshold so that upon reaching it the resultant total employment falls within the region of
positive (regular) profits (i.e., in the interval ∘E E( , )2 in Figure 2), then market forces (profit
maximization and/or free entry) will take employment further toward the sought‐after out-
come. As the threshold for new hires is exceeded in equilibrium, no subsidies need to be paid.5
Formally, our proposed policy takes the form of contingent wage subsidy, denoted by
S h H T( , , ), which is the amount paid to a firm with h new hires when the total number
∑H h= i i of new hires, counted across all the firms, does not exceed the threshold for new
hires set at T . Specifically, we say
Definition 3. A function  →S : +3 + is a contingent wage subsidy if ≥S h H T( , , ) 0
for ≤H T and S h H T( , , ) = 0 for H T> .
For the ease of notation, we let S h H T eΞ = { ( , , ), ( )}*i denote a policy profile that, besides
the policy, also includes the prepolicy vector of firm employment levels, ≡e e e( ) ( , …, )* * *i N1 . A
firm's after‐policy payoff, denoted by πΞ, is the sum of (regular) profits π and the amount of
contingent subsidy S
π e E π e E S e e E E T( , ) = ( , ) + ( − , − , ),* *Ξ (7)
5It is assumed throughout that in the nonequilibrium event when the threshold for new hires is not reached, the
government can resort to debt‐based methods to fund subsidies. From a practical perspective, we also note that the
contingent wage subsidy policy can also be designed in the form of loans or loan guarantees issued to cover firms'
additional labor expenses. Then, the condition is that loans need to be discharged only if the threshold for total new jobs
is exceeded; otherwise, loans are forgiven.
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where e and E are the after‐policy levels of the firm's own employment and of total employ-
ment, respectively, and e* and ∑E e=* *i i are the corresponding prepolicy levels of
employment.
Next, we show that there is a contingent wage subsidy that brings total employment to its
highest equilibrium without any expense on subsidies borne.
Proposition 1. Consider a competitive labor market. Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2
hold. Let the level of employment be at the lowest locally stable equilibrium E1. There is a
contingent wage subsidy S h H T( , , ) that strictly implements the highest locally stable
equilibrium E2 without any wage subsidies paid in equilibrium.
In words, provided that there is a region of positive profits at employment levels up to the
targeted outcome, a sufficiently generous subsidy scheme needs to be designed to bring the
economy to this region from which market competition takes employment further. Regarding
how generous the scheme needs to be, there is a lower bound on it as the scheme needs to
ensure positive profits πΞ for all levels of total new hires up to the threshold but there is no
upper bound on its generosity. The upper bound appears, however, in the case of oligopsonistic
labor market.
4 | OLIGOPSONISTIC LABOR MARKET
We relax the assumptions of free entry and a large number of firms and allow an individual
employment strategy to have an effect on expected productivity and wage. We still require
that N > 1. As profits π in (4) depend on own strategy e and aggregate strategy E only, we
can model an oligopsonistic labor market as the aggregative game N e πΓ = { , [0, ], }. As i
n the case of competitive labor market, we are interested in equilibrium aggregates E only.
For this purpose, we express total profits Π in the economy as a function of total
employment
E E μ w E w EΠ( ) = ( ( ( )) − ( )). (8)
In our analysis of the game Γ, we draw on the aggregate concurrence principle introduced
by Martimort and Stole (2012), which is based on the observation that in equilibrium all players
must agree on the aggregate. According to their Definition 2, our aggregative game Γ is
quasi‐linear because the payoff function π in (4) is a bilinear form.6 By Lemma 2 of Martimort
and Stole (2012), if E* is an equilibrium aggregate and e( )*i is a vector of equilibrium em-
ployment levels then E* must be a maximizer of the aggregate objective function E EΛ( , )*
defined as
N
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟∑ ∑
∈ ≠
E E
N
π E e EΛ( , ) = 1 − ,* *
i j i
j
(9)
6A bilinear form on a vector spaceV is a mapV V →× that is linear in each (functional) argument separately. In
the game Γ, the profit function, expressed as π eβ E= ( ), is linear in e and β E( ).
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or, using that the game Γ is of the quasi‐linear form,
⎜ ⎟
⎛
⎝
⎞
⎠E E π E
N
N
E EΛ( , *) = − − 1 *, . (10)
Thus, for any equilibrium E* it has to hold that
∈
E E E* = arg max Λ( , *).
E E e E e[ *− , *+ ]
(11)
We observe that since firms' strategy sets are restricted to e[0, ], the equilibrium aggregates
are the local maximizers of the aggregate objective function E EΛ( , )* . Throughout, we assume
differentiability and that every equilibrium aggregate is an interior maximizer found from the
first‐order condition E EΛ ( , ) = 0* *1 .7
4.1 | Total profits and equilibrium aggregate
For subsequent analysis, it is useful to relate the equilibrium condition E EΛ ( , ) = 0* *1 to the
total profits Π. In the following lemma, we establish that there cannot be an equilibrium in the
region of increasing total payoffs as otherwise firms would be willing to hire more labor.
Lemma 1. Let E* be an equilibrium aggregate of the game Γ determined by
E EΛ ( , ) = 0* *1 and let EΠ( ) > 0* . Then, we have EΠ′( ) < 0* .
As before, for the convenience of exposition we assume
Assumption 3. There are two equilibrium aggregates Em1 and Em2, with E E<m m1 2
and E E0 < Π( ) < Π( )m m1 2 .
The condition E EΠ( ) < Π( )m m1 2 is imposed to have that the higher employment aggregate Em2
is socially superior to the lower equilibrium aggregate Em1. Furthermore, by the existence of two
equilibria it is implicitly assumed that the difference between the equilibrium aggregates is suffi-
ciently large so that no firm can unilaterally move the economy from one equilibrium to the other.
In the oligopsonistic labor market with Assumption 3 satisfied, the negative
derivatives EΠ′( ) < 0m1 and EΠ′( ) < 0m2 , stemming from Lemma 1, imply together with
E E0 < Π( ) < Π( )m m1 2 that the equilibrium aggregates Em1 and Em2 must lie to the right of local
maximizers of the total profit function Π. These observations are illustrated in Figure 3, where we
use the same specification as in the case of the competitive labor market.
4.2 | Contingent wage subsidy
Before we present our main result for the case of oligopsonistic labor market, we introduce
some more notation and definitions. First, as contingent wage subsidy policy changes the payoff
7Here, and in what follows, a function's subscript j denotes its partial derivative with respect to the jth argument.
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structure of the labor market game Γ, we denote the after‐policy game with policy profile
S h H T eΞ = ( ( , , ), ( ))*i by N e πΓ = { , [0, ], }Ξ Ξ , where the payoff function πΞ is given by (7).
Noting that policy S h H T( , , ) does not change the aggregative structure of the game, we define
the aggregate objective function of the game ΓΞ as
N
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟∑ ∑
∈ ≠
E E
N
π E e EΛ ( , ) = 1 − , ,S
i j i
j
# Ξ # (12)
where e( )i# is an equilibrium of ΓΞ and E# is the equilibrium aggregate.
We also define
Definition 4. Contingent wage policy S h H T( , , ) is quasi‐linear if ΓΞ is a quasi‐linear
aggregative game.
Put differently, policy S h H T( , , ) is quasi‐linear if the after‐policy payoff function πΞ defined
in (7) is a bilinear form or, more simply, S h H T( , , ) is a bilinear form for a fixed threshold T .
This implies that the marginal return of labor, including the subsidy per worker, depends on
total employment only or that aggregate payoff ≡ ∑E π e EΠ ( ) ( , )i iΞ Ξ is a function of aggregate
employment E only.
Note that Lemma 1 continues to hold with quasi‐linear and differential policy S h H T( , , ).
Lemma 1’. Let E# be an equilibrium aggregate of the game ΓΞ determined by
E EΛ ( , ) = 01Ξ # # and let EΠ ( ) > 0Ξ # . Then, we have ∂ ∂E EΠ ( )/ < 0Ξ # .
The next proposition shows that contingent wage subsidy policy can also be effective in
oligopsony as it can steer the economy to its highest employment equilibrium without any
expense borne.
Proposition 2. Consider an oligopsonistic labor market and suppose that Assumption 3
holds. Let the level of employment be at the lowest equilibrium aggregate Em1. There is a
contingent wage subsidy S h H T( , , ) that strictly implements the highest equilibrium
aggregate Em2 without any wage subsidies paid in equilibrium.
Figure 4 illustrates Proposition 2. The economy is initially at the employment level Em1. After
the policy S h H T( , , ), described in the proposition, is introduced, the total payoff becomes in-
creasing in the region where the policy is in effect (see the dashed segment over the interval
FIGURE 3 Equilibrium
employment in an oligopsonistic labor
market
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E E[ , ′]m1 ). However, in this region no new equilibrium aggregate arises as we are always bound to
find a firm willing to hire more labor. Outside the policy's region, firms earn positive (regular)
profits, the competition for which ultimately takes the total employment to its highest equilibrium.
Importantly, unlike in the case of competitive labor market, here subsidies should not be too
generous so that in the policy's working region total payoffs do not exceed total payoffs outside
this region as it may create new equilibria that lead to the payout of subsidies. At the same time,
we also note that the insurance policy of compensating for losses only is not effective in oli-
gopsony. While ensuring positive profits is sufficient to eliminate bad equilibria in competitive
markets, it is not sufficient in noncompetitive markets. The mere elimination of the negative‐
profit region ∘E E[ , ]1 in Figure 4 does not eliminate the low‐employment equilibrium Em1.
Kiyotaki (1988) studies an economy with a large number of firms, where “pessimistic” and
“optimistic” investment equilibria can arise. He proposes, without formalization, an insurance
program under which if one firm invests in a large amount of capital corresponding to an
optimistic equilibrium but a pessimistic equilibrium is nevertheless realized, the government
will transfer a certain amount to that firm. Then, firms will invest optimistically if the sum of
this amount and the profit from optimistic investment is larger than the profit from pessimistic
investment under the pessimistic equilibrium. Our analysis suggests, however, that the con-
clusion of Kiyotaki (1988) that the optimistic equilibrium will be realized without any subsidies
paid depends on the assumption of price‐taking firms. For this conclusion to hold with oligo-
polistic firms, the amount of subsidy would have to be set to depend on aggregate investment to
ensure monotonically increasing total profits.
Lastly, there are several theoretical observations worth noting about the contingent wage
subsidy. Our results depend only on the aggregate of individual actions which means that firms
are not required to act symmetrically. Neither do our results depend on firms being homogeneous
provided the quasi‐linear aggregative structure of the underlying competition game is preserved
with heterogeneous firms. Furthermore, an important implication of Lemma 1' is that the con-
tingent wage subsidy is coalition‐proof. By this lemma, the aggregate equilibrium outcomes lie to
the right of the corresponding local maxima of the total profit function. Since coalitions do not
change the total profit function of the underlying game and the contingent wage subsidy policy is
effective only to the left from the global maximum, the change in the number of firms brought by
a coalition cannot lead to the disbursement of contingent subsidies in equilibrium.
5 | CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we propose a new policy aimed at shifting the economy from low‐ to high‐employment
equilibrium at no cost for the government. The policy offers firms contingent wage subsidies for new
FIGURE 4 Contingent wage
subsidy
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hires payable only if the prespecified threshold for total new hires is not reached. The role of
contingent subsidies is to generate a sufficiently large externality that would start the mechanism of
strategic employment complementarities taking employment further and beyond the threshold. The
second contribution of the paper is theoretical as we demonstrate how assurance contracts need to be
designed and applied in noncompetitive markets. In particular, we show that simple assurance
contracts which only compensate for losses may not be effective in noncompetitive markets.
The contingent wage subsidy policy can be related to policies on wage regulation. Similarly to
larger payroll expenses serving the purpose of the “big push” (Murphy, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1989),
an increase in the mandated minimum wage can generate an aggregate demand externality
justifying the increase; for empirical evidence, see Magruder (2013) and for recent discussions on
minimum wages, see Economides and Moutos (2016) and Bennett and Chioveanu (2017). Unlike
wage regulation, the contingent wage subsidy is not a coercive measure mandating firms to
take required actions, which can be bankrupting for some firms, but rather a device to help firms
coordinate on the socially desirable outcome.
In contrast to typical fiscal policy, the contingent wage subsidy does not distort the economy
towards the areas where the government spends. Under the proposed policy market prices
determine resource allocation where all expansions must pass a market test. In general, the
labor market application studied in this paper is only one of possible applications of contingent
subsidies. Such subsidies could be applied to any “big push” economic problem the successful
resolution of which requires the accumulation of critical mass.
The main limitation of our model is that the conditional wage subsidy policy is derived under
the assumption that the cause of low employment is known to be a macroeconomic coordination
failure (e.g., in the aftermath of a pandemic). Generally, a reduction in employment could also be
caused by a real economic shock such as an adverse productivity shock. Future research could
examine the contingent wage subsidy policy under a more general setup. For instance, one di-
rection could be to assume two aggregate states, high and low, about which the government does
not have perfect information. Aggregate productivity in the low state is low enough so that only the
bad equilibrium exists. In the high state aggregate productivity is such that both the good and the
bad equilibria exist. Making an analogy to the bank runs model (e.g., Diamond & Dybvig, 1983), we
can have two types of crisis: (a) fundamental crisis when the economy is in the low state; (b)
expectation driven crisis when the economy is in the high state but in the bad equilibrium. The
contingent wage subsidy is effective and implies no disbursements only if the crisis is expectation
driven; otherwise subsidies would have to be disbursed. An interesting research problem is to find
the optimal form of contingent wage subsidy policy when the type of crisis is uncertain and whether
this policy would still be preferable to typical “big push” fiscal policy.
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APPENDIX A: PROOFS
Proof of Proposition 1. Due to the continuity of η there must be at least one equilibrium
between E1 and E2 and denote the closest equilibrium to E2 by ∘E . Consider a policy
profile S h H T eΞ = { ( , , ), ( )}i1 , where e( )i1 is the prepolicy equilibrium and the policy
S h H T( , , ) has ∈ ∘T E E E E( − , − )1 2 1 and the amount of subsidy such that a firm's
resultant payoff satisfies (a) π e E( , ) > 0Ξ for any ≤E E T+1 and e e> 1, where e1 is the
firm's prepolicy level of employment, and (b) π e E( , )Ξ is increasing in e for E E T< +1 .
Such a policy exists as there is no upper bound on subsidies. Clearly, E1 is not a locally
stable equilibrium anymore but neither is any E E T< +1 because firms can increase
their payoff by increasing their employment levels. The total employment E E T= +1 is
not an equilibrium either because (regular) profits π are strictly positive in the
neighborhood of E T+1 which implies the possibility of profitable entries into the
market. Ultimately, strictly positive regular profits π e E( , ) for ∈E E T E[ + , )1 2 result in
firms' hiring until total employment reaches the locally stable equilibrium E2. This also
establishes that E2 is the unique equilibrium. □
Proof of Lemma 1. The equilibrium condition E EΛ ( , ) = 0* *1 implies from (10) that
⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎛⎝
⎞
⎠
⎛
⎝
⎞
⎠π
E
N
E π E
N
E, + , = 0.* * * *1 2 (A1)
The condition of positive profits, EΠ( ) > 0* , implies that in equilibrium the expected
marginal net return of labor, given by the partial derivative π1, must be positive, that is
( )π E, > 0*EN1 * . Then, it follows from (A1) that ( )π E, < 0*EN2 * .
As the profit function π is a bilinear form, we have
⎜ ⎟
⎛
⎝
⎞
⎠π E
N
N
E E π E E N
N
π E E− − 1 , = ( , ) − − 1 ( , )* * (A2)
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which implies, after noting that E π E EΠ( ) = ( , ),
E E E N
N
π E EΛ( , ) = Π( ) − − 1 ( , ).* * (A3)
Differentiating both sides with respect to E and using the equilibrium condition
E EΛ ( , ) = 0* *1 , we find
E N
N
π E EΠ′( ) = − 1 ( , ) < 0* * *2
as required. □
Proof of Lemma 1'. It is analogous to the proof of Lemma 1. □
Proof of Proposition 2. Let ∈E E E′ ( , )m m1 2 be the employment level closest to Em1 such
that E EΠ( ′) = Π( )m2 . Such level E′ must exist because of E E0 < Π( ) < Π( )m m1 2 by
Assumption 3 and EΠ′( ) < 0m1 and EΠ′( ) < 0m2 from Lemma 1. Consider policy profile
S h H T eΞ = { ( , , ), ( )}im1 , where e( )im1 is the prepolicy equilibrium and the policy
S h H T( , , ) has the following properties: (i) it is quasi‐linear, (ii) the threshold is set at
T E E= ′ − m1 , (iii) the resultant total payoff function EΠ ( )Ξ is twice differentiable and
strictly increasing in ∈E E E[ , ′]m1 , and (iv) S h T T( , , ) = 0 or E EΠ ( ′) = Π( ′)Ξ . See
Figure 4 for an illustration of such a policy. Next, we show that in the after‐policy game
ΓΞ there is no employment level ∈E E E[ , ′]m1 that is an equilibrium aggregate. Since ΓΞ
is quasi‐linear due to property (i), each equilibrium aggregate E# must satisfy
E E E= arg max Λ ( , )E# Ξ # . The previous equilibrium aggregate Em1 is no longer
equilibrium because E EΛ ( , )mΞ 1 increases in E to the right from E E= m1 due to
property (iii). Because of properties (ii) and (iii), Lemma 1' implies that there is no
equilibrium aggregate in the interval E E( , ′)m1 . If the employment level E′ were an
equilibrium aggregate, then it would also be an equilibrium aggregate in the prepolicy
game Γ because of E E E EΛ ( ′, ′) = Λ( ′, ′)Ξ due to property (iv) but this contradicts
Assumption 3. We obtain an analogous contradiction for any other ∈ ∩E E E E[ , ′]m m1 2.
Thus, Em2 is the only equilibrium aggregate. □
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